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BENCH AND BAR

BENCH AND BAR
THE LAWYER OF TOMORROW t
Bv Hox. GEORGE T. McDERmorr *
HE invitation to speak to you tonight proved too much for my
feeble power of resistance, for the fame of this annual dinner has
reached even the hinterland from which I come. It is a signal honor to
break bread with the members of the bar of this great state; a bar which
has given to the nation so many great lawyers and jurists, including at the
present time a Justice of the Supreme Court and the Attorney General of
the nation; a bar which gave to that empire between the Mississippi and
the Mountains, its greatest jurist, the late Walter H. Sanborn; a bar from
which came Judge Booth, another of the outstanding judges of the Middle
West, who has particularly endeared himself to Kansas lawyers; and
"young John Sanborn," as his fellows call him, whose career already promises much for the future. When to that honor is added the privilege of
speaking from the same rostrum as those eminent men who have graced
this board in previous years, my cup runneth over. But it is not all beer
and skittles, for I think I now know something of the catch in the throat
which a bush leaguer must have when he first walks to the plate in the
majors.
That natural consternation is intensified by the realization that I have
no gripping message to deliver. I am not one of those who have lost
confidence in law and lawyers; I do not believe that everything is going
to poL On the contrary, I think our laws, imperfect though they may be,
are the best rules yet devised for the game of life. I think most men are
honest and want to do the right thing. I think that, as a whole, lawyers
are entirely worthy of the confidence reposed in them, and are true to their
trusts. While there are spots which are disturbing, I have an abiding faith
that the genius of the American people will re-assert itself, and that we
will go on to even a higher plane. Such a feeling of confidence and optimism is a comfortable one, but it does not afford a good background for
an address.
I have therefore concluded to speak particularly to the students of this
great Law School-you who %villbe the lawyers of tomorrow. And all I
hope to do is to leave with you some suggestions that you may think about
at your leisure. I would not have you accept what I may say as true, if I
could; and I could not, if I would. Your fine education has given you, first
of all, a receptive but inquiring mind. If the years have taught me anything, which may be open to dispute, it is that men do not learn by being
told; they learn by testing ideas in the crucible of their own minds with the
flame of their own experience. And this is as it should be.
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Your professional career will carry with it two separate and distinct
responsibilities. The first, and the most absorbing, is the responsibility to
yourself and your family. You want, and properly want, to go as far in
your chosen profession as you can. No one can be of much help to you in
that struggle. You must stand on your own feet and fight your own
battle. But one thing can be said with entire assurance, and that is, there
is no dollar mark engraved on the cup that is awarded the victor. Eminence
in the legal profession may, and often does, bring moderate wealth in its
wake; but it is but a by-product of success; the victor's cup is awarded to
him who, by his unswerving honesty, his adherence to lofty ideals, his
staunch courage, and his legal learning, has gained and held the confidlence
of his neighbors and the respect of his fellows.
The other responsibility that will come with your degree is a public
one, a responsibility which you will share with other members of the profession. This public responsibility is sometimes divided into what may be
termed a responsibility to your profession, to the end that the administration of justice may be improved; and a responsibility to the nation to which
you owe your allegiance; this responsibility rests upon every citizen, but a
lawyer's training peculiarly equips him for its discharge, and his responsibility is thereby increased. Professional and civic responsibility shade into
each other, for, after all, a proper administration of justice is the chief aim
of government.
The lawyers of yesterday have done their bit. The lawyers of today,
working generally through bar associations, are doing theirs. Together,
they are able to report substantial progress. Largely through tile ever
widening influence of the faculties of the law schools, the standards of
admission to the bar have been so elevated that some intellectual attainment and a reasonably thorough training in the fundamentals are now required of those who enter the profession. The methods of study are now
undergoing critical analysis, in an effort to turn out a still better product.
Attention is being given, more and more, to the moral training and discipline which is the sine qua non of real success at the bar. Codes of
ethics have been evolved, and progress is being made in requiring their observance. Although there is still much to be desired, a determined effort
is being made to rid the profession of those moral lepers who pollute the
fountain of justice at its very source, by the use of perjured evidence.
With such, there should be no temporizing; there is but one remedythrow them out of the profession with little ceremony, and without benefit
of clergy.
The bar is today grappling with another problem, a problem brought
about by the circumstance that facility of communication, on the rails, over
wires, and through the ether of space, has welded the states into a comnpact nation. A hundred years ago, no serious inconvenience resulted because the laws of the different states were of varying patterns. But in more
recent times, the crazy quilt of statutes and decisions of varying color and
design has proven to be a substantial obstacle to the interplay of business.
And so for many yearsthe Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws
has labored to harmonize statutory law in many fields. If that body had accomplished nothing else, the enactment of the Uniform Negotiable Instru-
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ments Law would have justified its existence. For about ten yearb. the
lawyers and judges and teachers have been working, shoulder to shoulder,
in the more difficult field of non-statutory law, in an effort to bring some
sort of order out of the wilderness of court decisions. It is too early to
predict, with confidence, what success may attend upon the efforts of the
members of the American Law Institute. But whether they succeed or
fail, we know at least that they have tried.
Other matters are having the present attention of the profession.
Lawyers have always been officers of the court in name; the present effort is to
make them officers of the court in fact. The trial of a case in court ought
to be a simple quest for the truth; the lawvyers ought to be the aides of the
court in the inquiry. The legislatures of many of our states have so
circumscribed the power of the judge that the court room is little more
than an arena where lawyers engage in forensic combat, and where the object
is a victory rather than the ascertainment of the facts. Public and private
agencies devoted to a better administration of the law have taken note of
this situation, and the trend of the times is for the better.
The tendency to commercialize the profession is meeting with stubborn
resistance. The practice of the profession as a side line to corporate commercial activities is being checked. I do not know how it may be with you,
but in our circuit I think the race between the ambulance chaser and the
adjuster is about run. The bench and bar are getting tired of the revolting
spectacle of an officer of the court tendering his services with proclamations of his own virtues. It has not been wiped out, but it cannot last long
after the profession is thoroughly aroused to the wrongs done to the unfortunate people who are the particular prey of the solicitor.
But this is enough of the present and its problems. You are interested
in the problems that are just over the hill. And problems there are; I (1o
not know their answer, but I do know that the answer, if one exists, will
only be found if those who follow us seek to find it. It is fitting, as well
as inevitable, that there is room for improvement; for. as was long ago
said, change and decay are the law of life. The moment that we stop inproving, decay sets in. Our physical selves are the product of centuries of
evolution; our moral and spiritual selves are the results of a constant
yearning to better ourselves. The restlessness of youth prompts a desire
to change for change's sake, which ofttimes is not wise. The complacency
of age suggests that well enough be let alone. Perhaps there may be a
happy mean between youth and age; perhaps it is an unyielding adherence
to certain fundamental principles of justice, coupled with a determination to
better the machinery by which they are applied.
I have already adverted to one of the major problems that so far has
not been satisfactorily solved, and that is the matter of control over the
lawyer after he is admitted. More injury comes to the profession, and
more damage to the public, from the machinations of a handful of unscrupulous lawyers, than comes by the admission of those intellectually unfit
to practice. There are a few lawyers untrue to their trusts; a few who
collect and do not pay; a few who flirt with the penitentiary by the use of
perjured evidence. There ought to be some accessible body to which any
aggrieved person could readily apply, for redress for wrongs done, and
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with disciplinary control over the wrongdoer. Such a body should take
note of pettifoggery, solicitation, and other unethical practices, and should
first instruct, then warn, and then strike. Whether the suggestion of the
integrated bar will solve the problem, I do not know; it is at least an effort
in that direction; perhaps it will come by committees appointed by the
courts; or perhaps by law societies such as have given such standing to the
English bar. But whatever the method used, firm control must be exercised
over those who practice the profession.
Another major problem is the inefficiency of the machinery of the
courts. Lawsuits generally turn on what happened; what was said or done
on a given occasion, or what correspondence passed between the parties.
Once in a while a suit turns on what the law is. In the ordinary case, it
takes a year or more to find out. That's too long, and there's no reason for
it. The result is, to take a man into court, where justice will be administered, is a threat; it ought to be a promise. Another result is that all over
the country, and in all sorts of organizations oi business men, arbitration
tribunals are being set up to do the work that courts are organized and
paid to do. These are not the informal arbitrations of disputes which have
existed as long as men have bartered their wares; they arc trial tribunals,
adjudicating rights according to legal principles, and frequently with the
right of appeal. In ten years, the legislatures of twelve states have put
back of their awards all of the power of government, together with the
machinery for enforcement. Their awards are judgments. Why have
There
business men, at their own expense, established these tribunals?
may be a variety of reasons, but one controlling and sufficient reason is
that it takes the courts too long to find out who owns the farm. That
there is no necessity for the interminable delays that occur in the ordinary
litigation is demonstrated, I think, by the fact that arbitration tribunals
decide controversies, without sacrificing the fundamentals of adequate
notice and a fair hearing, within a few weeks' time; and by the fact that
the English courts, as a rule, act with amazing celerity.
There has been a disposition to charge the delays to procedural rules.
I doubt if the fault is there. Any fair procedure must afford adequate
notice of the claim made, and an opportunity to deny, avoid, or counterclaim. Issues must be framed, and enough time allowed thereafter to
assemble the proofs. Our rules make allowance for the unusual case, and
the time limits prescribed for answer or reply are maximums, and not
minimums, as many counsel for the defense seem to think. It may be
that procedural rules may be improved; suggestions have been made that
appeals might be perfected, as is done in some countries, by carrying the
court files from the office of one clerk to that of another; another suggestion is that a preliminary, informal conference between court and counsel
would be an aid in getting at the kernel of the controversy quickly. These
suggestions are worthy of study, but that is not my point. My point is
that while procedural rules may not prevent delay, they certainly do not
cause it. Given two opposing lawyers who want a speedy adjudication of a
controversy, and a court willing to cooperate, as most of them are, almost
any lawsuit can be finally determined in a very brief period of time under
our present rules. The delays are not caused by the rules; the delays are
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caused by the lawyers, and at times, the courts. When a case comes into a
law office, the lawyer investigates the facts and the law, and in a few days'
time knows what the case turns on and the chances of success; ordinarily
he is as ready to try the case in a week's time as he ever will be. But le does
not try it; instead, he dictates a memorandum so lhe will not forget it during
the ensuing year, and goes back to work on a case that came into the office
year before last. Occasionally a lawyer delays a case deliberately, his
oath to the contrary notwithstanding; more often, it is from force of habit.
But it is a bad habit, one that is bringing reproach to the profession and
driving justiciable controversies from the offices of lawyers and from the
chambers of courts. And some judges must bear their share of the blame.
Judges exist who hold matters under advisement for inexcusable periods;
their theory must be that if they postpone decision until their minds are no
longer confused by the argument, and until they have forgotten whether it
is a suit on a promissory note or an action to compel a father to support
the child, they will stand at least a fifty-fifty chance of being right. It is a
hard choice betAveen the judge who decides before be hears-who shoots
from the hip---and one who never decides. The law is not and never will
be an exact science, and as a whole, I believe society is better off with 75
per cent justice today, than with 80 per cent justice a year from next fall.
The time-honored institution of trial by jury is under fire from many
quarters. I think it will survive. Although the necessity for it may not be
as acute as it was in centuries that are gone, it still is the 'best insurance
against oppression that has been devised. And aside from its value in that
respect, a jury of ordinarily intelligent men, drawvn from all walks of life,
can sift the true from the false, and.determine the reasonableness of men's
actions, better than any one man. While I think the jury system is sound,
its administration may be improved. The power of the presiding judge to
analyze and classify and fairly comment upon the evidence of both sides
was an inseparable attribute of trial by jury at common law; the strongest
strictures against the system exist where the judge has been stripped of
that power. It should be restored. More attention may well be paid to the
personnel of the jury, and to their instruction in the high responsibilities of
the position. Courts can do much by dealing firmly with tie pettifogger
who attempts to distract the jury's attention from their task of ascertaining
the truth. Where experts battle on technical questions, assistance might
well be given the jurors by a disinterested expert called and examined by
the court, the fees for such services being taxed as costs. And, of
course, there are questions of fact of such complexity that juries cannot
handle them. The statutes or rules of practice which define such questions
and prescribe their method of determination may not be as flexible as they
should. Other suggestions will occur to you; but I believe that it will
behoove you to think well before you abolish the system that has survived
the centuries since Runnymede and has, as a whole, served us well.
There is pretty general agreement that the administration of the law
can be bettered in respect to the matters to which I have adverted. Other
changes are in the air concerning the wisdom of which there is not such
general agreement. The soundness of the rule of stare decisis is again
under critical examination. The English courts, backed by a people who
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are primarily lovers of order, have clung without deviation to the rule that
a decision of the highest court of the land is the law until changed by Parliament. The English proceed upon the principle that it is better to have
a settled rule of conduct, even though it be imperfect, than to have no rule
at all. The Civil law, on the contrary, proceeds upon the general assumption that nothing should be settled until it is settled right. The theory of a
prompt legislative correction of judicial mistakes does not always work out,
and in constitutional cases the legislature is powerless.
And where a
broader experience, or changing conditions, or more mature reflection, makes
clear that an old decision is not sound, judges are sorely tried when confronted with the proposition of wrongly deciding a particular case onl account of it, and at the same time further crystallizing an error. On the
other hand, society cannot exist without rules; and if the rules are to be
changed with the varying whims of the personnel of the bench, it is an
invitation to all to violate the rules and to defend on the ground that the
rule violated was never the law, but only a mistake. Although the subject
has received the attention of the ourts for years, no entirely satisfactory
passage between the Scylla and Charybdis of these two principles has been
discovered. Your generation may be able to find it.
Leaving the field of strictly professional problems, we find controversial
ground in the field of governmental activities. The ramifications of modelii
society are such that legislative bodies find more and more use for commissions and bureaus to which are delegated the duties of concretely applying
abstract principles laid down by the law-making body. Other commissions
are established to determine facts in present controversies, in aid of the
judicial branch. This sitiiation gives rise to the growing complaint that we
are reverting to the bureaucratic governments of the monarchs of old.
The propriety and necessity of fact-developing agencies as an aid in the discharge of governmental functions is not seriously disputed. The controversy
arises over the finality of their conclusions. One school of thought leans to
the view that as long as there are notice and hearing, the personnel of the
final arbiter is not of vital importance. The other school clings to the view
that in our three-part government, every citizen has a right, sometime and
somewhere, to bring his troubles to the attention of a court, and that the
doors of our courts of justice should never be entirely closed to even the
humblest of our citizens. The subject is too involved and troublesome to
do more now than to suggest to you that this is one of the problems that
deserve your close attention.
Another controversial subject concerns itself with the extent of the
power of our government over its citizens. It is a problem that will not
stay settled. Our courts have struggled with it since they were organized.
Prior to the adoption of our constitution, the power of government over
its subjects was theoretically complete. The framers of our constitution
undertook to stake out certain fields of individual rights upon which government might not encroach. What the boundaries are of such fields is
the question. One group believes the stakes, as set by the constitution,
mark out definite but comparatively small tracts of individual right. The
other group, commonly called the conservatives or reactionaries, believes
that the constitution makers intended a radical departure from the absolute
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power of government over the individual, and that they intended to stake
out comparatively large, if somewhat indefinite, fields of personal rights.
Just what was the intention of the colonists who adopted the constitution
will never be known. It is doubtful if they had any conscious thought
about the problems of today. I have but a thought or two to leave with
you in this connection. The constitution is a declaration of general principles; the application of those principles must and does change with a
changing world. Statutes that would have been in clear opposition to those
principles fifty years ago may not now be in conflict with them, where
conditions have radically changed. The zoning ordinances are but an example. Fifty years ago, an ordinance that would have denied a man the
right to erect a grocery store on his own land might well have been deemed
to be arbitrary, just as today a similar ordinance in a country town might
serve no public purpose. The development of urban life has been such
that now all courts agree that there must be some system, for the public
good, in the building of the great cities of today. One other thought: The
people of this country are entitled to any sort of government they wvant;
if they want an absolute government, they may have it. But if a fundamental change is to be made in the structure of our government, it ought
to be made by the people, and not by their legislatures or their courts.
I have roamed around enough to establish the proposition that there is
work ahead; that problems exist that you must solve, if they are to be
solved. In grappling with the questions to which I have referred, there is
room for experiment; we can cut and try without danger to the institutions
of free government. There are, however, at least two tendencies now apparent in this country which involve fundamental principles which do not
change, and concerning which there is no room for experimentation or
temporizing. Strangely enough, they are exact opposites. I refer to the
subjugation of the civil authority to the military, an absolute government
which we call martial law; and to racketeering, which is the denial of the
authority of any law.
When I speak of martial law, I do not refer to the use of troops to
aid the civil authorities; I refer to the suspension of the power of civil
authorities in a restricted territory, and the substitution therefor of martial
law. In a very true sense, the expression "martial law" is a misnomer, for
it is not law at all in the sense that we are accustomed to use the word ;
martial law is the will of the commanding officer. There is a place in a
free country for martial law, for even the iron hand of a swashbuckler in
uniform is infinitely better than no law at all; if the civil authorities no
longer function, if the courts are closed and the executives abdicate. so
that the civil law is but a name and not a living force, then martial law
is proper. But functioning civil authorities must not be displaced by the
military, simply because the executive is restive under the restraints imposed by the constitution and laws of our country.
The most direct threat to our government, however, is the system of
racketeering that has fastened itself upon so many of our cities, and whose
tentacles are now reaching out for the Arcadia from which I come. Racketeering is a blunt denial of the authority of any law. Its edicts come front
dives instead of legislative halls; its decrees are passed by a criminal sur-

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
rounded by bodyguards, instead of by a judge on the bench; they are carried out by machine guns in crowded streets, instead of a sheriff backed by
the authority of his office. Gangdom has not confined its operations to the
underworld and its activities; it is imposing its will upon honest, hardworking, law-abiding citizens of our cities. Its only authority is the terror
inspired by its ruthless killings. Either the law or racketeering must go.
They cannot exist side by side, for it is as true now as it was threequarters of a century ago, that this country cannot "endure permanently
half slave and half free." I cannot help but believe that the force of
public opinion, when thoroughly aroused, is such that racketeering can and
will be scourged to its den. But go it must, and if the orderly processes
of the civil authorities are inadequate for the task, the military must be used.
For we live in a Universe of Order, so decreed by an all-wise Creator.
The planets in their orbits and the stars in their courses follow, with matchless precision, a system of law and order. The great Chief Justice held
that "This is a government of laws, and not of men." There must be some
law, even though it be martial law. Denying any authority except that of
terrorism, a challenge to law and order has come to us from gangland; we
must meet it.
The lawyers are the sentries of our government. Because of their
training, they are better able than any other class to detect the stealthy
approach of the enemies of our free institutions. You, the lawyers of tomorrow, are about to take your post in the watchtowers of our republic.
Conscious of your peculiar responsibility, I can do no more than conmend to you the first general order to every sentry as he takes his post"To be always on the alert," for as was said long ago, "Eternal Vigilance
is the price of Liberty." The lawyers of yesterday have done their part;
the lawyers of today are doing theirs; you will, I know, carry on.

